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Introduction 
Unrecognised (also known as contested) states, i.e. entities that pursue or 
maintain independent statehood over a defined territory and which are not 
members of the UN
i, are at the heart of some of the world’s and Europe’s most intractable conflicts. 
The European Union (EU) has engaged with this type of entities and conflicts in 
many different ways. Apart from bringing Cyprus and the unrecognised Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the EU, the Enlargement of 2004 
redefined the borders of the Union and promoted a ‘geographical imagination’ of 
a wider neighbourhood that it should engage with (Bialasiewicz et al. 2009). This 
gave new geopolitical importance to the many secessionist conflicts of the post-
Soviet space that have given birth to unrecognised states, including Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. In addition, the EU is also 
involved in Africa, which hosts similar disputes (Western Sahara, Somaliland) 
and for years, has been involved with state- building in Palestine and Kosovo, 
which, although relatively more recognised, they are still far from full 
recognition and UN membership. More recently, the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and 
secession efforts in Luhansk and Donetsk show the ongoing importance of 
unrecognised statehood for European politics and securityii.  
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Partly responding to these developments, many scholars have investigated the 
EU’s involvement in conflicts, including those that relate to unrecognised states 
(For example: Coppieters  et al. 2004,  Tocci 2008). Hughes (2010) has offered 
an edition of works on the Balkans, post-soviet space but also the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and Africa, while the edition by Wolff and Whitman (2012) added more 
case studies that are often neglected within EU literature, such as Afghanistan. 
Yet, these works do not elaborate on specificities of unrecognised states and 
their significance for conflict and international security. There is some literature 
on major state-building projects like Kosovo and Palestine, which, however, does 
not make important inferences with regards to the relevance of unrecognised 
statehood (e.g. Tansey 2007, Turner 2011, Bouris 2014). Oppositely, with few 
notable but mostly case-driven exceptions (e.g. Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012 
with reference to Kosovo, Kyris 2015 with reference to the TRNC), little has been 
said about how the EU engages with unrecognised states that, unlike Palestine or 
Kosovo, it has less appetite to endorse or assist their state legitimacy.  
 
Unrecognised states enjoy more attention from scholars of broader international 
politics, where a range of works have reflected on their characteristics (e.g. 
Geldenhuys 2009, Carspensen and Stansfield 2011, Caspersen 2012), political 
systems (Berg and Mölder 2012, Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2012), also with regard 
to conflict resolution (King 2001), democratisation (e.g. Carspensen 2011, Voller 
2013), or how the international community has reacted to their self-declaration 
(e.g. Pegg 1998, Lynch 2004, Musson 2008, Fabry 2009, Ker-Lindsay 2012).  
Some authors have offered important insights into the so-called international 
‘engagement without recognition’ of these entities (Cooley and Mitchell 2010, 
Ker-Lindsay 2015, Ker-Lindsay and Berg 2018, see also last section), especially 
in the context of humanitarian aid and peace processes (Caspersen and Herrberg 
2010, Berg and Pegg 2016). Yet, because of the dominance of works from the 
disciplines of international relations or law (e.g.Grant 1999, Crawford 2007, 
Coggins 2011) the situation on the ground of unrecognised states and 
implications for EU engagement have not been systematically theorised.  
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In this regard, we can identify a series of interrelated gaps in the literature with 
reference to a) the EU and unrecognised states, b) especially those that, unlike 
Kosovo or Palestine, remain largely unrecognised (see later for differences 
between variant types) and c) more internal characteristics of statehood 
(authority and control of the government, what we could call ‘empirical 
statehood’) and their significance. As a result, a more systematic 
conceptualisation of unrecognised states, also with reference to EU engagement, 
is missing. In this regard, this article explores how characteristics of 
unrecognised statehood influence the EU’s engagement and, in particular, 
investigates the largely unrecognised TRNC in order to complement the 
literature on state-building that has focused on unrecognised states with more 
extensive recognition. 
 
As such, this is an empirically-driven but largely inductive and concept-oriented 
study of the TRNC case. A controlled historical analysis of the TRNC aims to 
develop causal explanations that might be generalised across a greater number 
of similar cases (George and Bennet 2005) of unrecognised states. Therefore, 
attention is paid more on the causal links between characteristics of statehood 
(independent variable) and EU approaches (dependent variable) in order to 
provide some lessons for other unrecognised states, rather than a detailed 
account of the process that links these variables (see also Dessler cited in George 
and Bennett 2005). Lastly, the TRNC is an ideal case study because, following the 
EU accession of Cyprus, it is the largely unrecognised state that that has come 
closest to the EU, which has meant greater engagement and more researchable 
data. Building on years-long research on the case study (see also Kyris 2014, 
2015, 2017), data has been collected from policy papers, evaluation reports but 
also from semi-structured interviews with EU and Turkish Cypriot elites 
including during five separate fieldwork trips in Brussels and Cyprus (two in 
2009, two in 2016, 2018), which allowed the triangulation of findings as well as 
offering explanations of EU approaches, therefore adding to the establishment of 
causal links (Van Era 1997, 65).  
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Through this case study analysis and in the next section of this paper, Ι use the 
case study to inductively identify the way in which the EU is engaging with 
largely unrecognised states, an approach that I call ‘state avoidance’. Informed by 
existing literature on conflict and the EU in particular, I group my findings into 
four main elements of this approach: a) sui generis management of unrecognised 
borders, b) informal engagement with officials of the unrecognised state, c) 
replacement of public authorities with non-state actors and d) extensive 
engagement with civil society. In the next and last section, I analyse how this 
approach is informed by two characteristics of the TRNC as a largely 
unrecognised state: the extensive lack of recognition and the de facto presence of 
empirical statehood in terms of effective government authority and control. I 
then contrast state avoidance to statebuilding approaches, in cases such as 
Kosovo and Palestine that are the mirror image of cases similar to the TRNC: i.e. 
less empirical statehood when the EU started being involved on the ground 
combined with more, but still far from full, international recognition. I 
consequently make the argument for a broader conceptualisation of the 
phenomenon of unrecognised states, allowing for variation in both the degree of 
recognition and of empirical statehood. As such, the article combines a 
discussion of rich empirical findings and inductive concept-building and 
advances a broader conceptualisation of unrecognised states, which is 
conductive to understanding and further researching the phenomenon, 
especially as far as engagement from the EU is concerned.  
The EU in Cyprus and the TRNC 
Cyprus gained independence in 1960 but the failure of the two communities to 
cooperate under a unitary state led to conflict and eventual territorial and 
administrative division: a UN buffer zone, the so-called ‘Green Line’, divides the 
island between Greek Cypriots in the south, who now dominate the once bi-
communal RoC, and Turkish Cypriots in the north and under the separatist 
TRNCiii. Since then, numerous UN-led peace efforts have tried to establish a 
federation that will replace the RoC (Richmond 2001) but, given this was not 
possible before EU accession, the island joined the EU divided (Kyris 2015). This 
created a unique geopolitical situation: while the entire country is considered EU 
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territory, the northern part is beyond the control of the Greek Cypriot-led RoC, 
which is the state recognised as EU member. In this regard and in spite of some 
initial links with the Turkish Cypriots, the EU’s involvement in northern Cyprus 
mostly started with the EU accession in 2004 and today continues with two main 
instruments: the Green Line Regulation, which regulates trade between the 
Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, and the Financial Aid Regulation, which 
aims at the financial and technical assistance of Turkish Cypriots, and their 
preparation for implementation of EU law, if and when a reunified state will 
replace the RoC as an EU member state. In absence of Turkish Cypriot 
participation in institutions like the European Council or the Council of the EU, 
where the Greek Cypriots represent the RoC, the European Commission has been 
the main interlocutor of Turkish Cypriots through its role in implementing the 
two regulations, although there was also a short-lived (2010-2015) European 
Parliament (EP) High Level Contact Group for the Relations with the Turkish 
Cypriot Communityfor a more political engagement with the locals (Kyris 2013).  
 
This EU engagement has faced significant limitations because of the unique 
political and institutional situation in Cyprus and the TRNC. The Financial Aid 
Regulation is a seemingly typical instrument of EU assistance in the context of 
preparing for implementation of the acquis communautaire, the body of EU law. 
Yet, while usually EU funding is implemented through national authorities, this 
was not possible in this case, because neither the RoC has effective control over 
northern Cyprus nor the TRNC could be seen as the national counterpart so as to 
host an EU delegation. In terms of operationalisation, the non-recognition of the 
TRNC has not allowed the EU to develop certain capacity-building activities that 
could assist with implementation. Questions are also raised as to whether 
liability of projects that are funded by the EU can be transferred to the 
unrecognised TRNC authorities (Court of Auditors 2012, 1). All these relate to 
issues of international recognition and the EU’s apparent reluctance to engage in 
fear of recognising by implication (interview with European Commission official, 
2009). In this case, the EU seems to advance the sovereignty of the RoC rather 
than the unrecognised state and unlike what we see in state-building projects of 
Kosovo or Palestine- I discuss this in greater detail in the next section.  
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Yet, the most significant example of how the lack of recognition has 
compromised engagement is the EU proposal for a preferential trade agreement. 
By far the most ambitious initiative with regard to the Turkish Cypriots, the 
proposal was prepared by the European Commission after the UN-proposed plan 
for the reunification of Cyprus was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in April 2004 
and sealed the accession of a divided island into the EU a month later. The main 
objective of the proposal is to lift the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, who, 
unlike the Greek Cypriots, favoured reunification in the ballot box, and also 
encourage eventual reunification of Cyprus by assisting Turkish Cypriot 
development (European Commission 2004). Yet, the proposal is yet to be ratified 
by the European Council, where the RoC objects its implementation on the 
grounds that would imply recognition of the TRNC (interview with MEP 2009, 
interview with KTTO member A’ 2009).  
 
In spite of and perhaps because of all the challenges analysed so far, the EU has 
sought to device alternative ways in which the Green Line and Financial Aid 
regulations would be better implemented, which are analysed below. Findings 
have been grouped into four main elements, informed by the existing literature 
on unrecognised states and related conflicts. First, analysis focuses on the 
management of the de facto but unrecognised border between Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots, with a view to contribute to the literature that has 
relatively neglected unliterary-erected boundaries in favour of recognised 
borders (see for example Newman 2001). Secondly, EU engagement with 
reference to public authorities but also civil society is explored. Looking at public 
authorities seems appropriate for exploring the issues of limited recognition and, 
drawing on studies that have focused on engagement with authorities from 
unrecognised states (e.g. Pegg 1998, Ker-Lindsay 2015, Kyris 2015) findings 
have been grouped under two different headlines, one exploring how the EU 
deals with unrecognised state authorities, and a second one elaborating on 
unique ways in which the EU has tried to avoid interaction with them. Finally, 
the focus on civil society is informed by the fact a significant number of works 
highlight civil society as a main interlocutor of the international community with 
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similar conflicts (e.g. Kyris 2013, Berg and Pegg 2016, Hoch, Kopeček and Baar 
2017), but this article adds to the discussion by more systematically exploring 
the link between support to civil society and unrecognised statehood.  
 
a) Sui Generis Management of Unrecognised Borders  
Findings suggest that the lack of international recognition of the TRNC has major 
geopolitical consequences for EU engagement and the way in which the 
unrecognised border between the RoC and the TRNC has been managed. More 
specifically and whereas the Green Line Regulation explicitly states that the 
Green Line, the UN buffer zone that separates the two communities into two 
separate administrative and territorial units, is not an external border or the EU 
(given that the TRNC is not recognised as a state neighbouring the RoC), the aim 
of the EU here is to introduce special conditions that ensure the movement of 
goods and people across the divided island, since northern Cyprus remains 
effectively outside the EU. In this regard, an unrecognised but de facto boundary 
has forced the EU to respond in a suis generis way. What is more, the interplay 
between the lack of international recognition on the one hand and the relatively 
strong empirical statehood of the TRNC becomes very significant. The capacity of 
the unrecognised state to control its territory and raise a boundary that is, 
however, not recognised makes the situation more complicated and poses the EU 
with the challenge to regulate a border, within its territory, that does not 
formally acknowledge. The rationale of the Green Line Regulation does not leave 
any room for alternative explanations for this type of engagement, other than the 
unique geopolitical situation that emanates from the unrecognised state and its 
border:   
‘This suspension [of the acquis] makes it necessary to provide for 
the terms under which the relevant provisions of EU law shall apply 
to the line between the abovementioned areas [i.e. northern 
Cyprus] and those areas in which the Government of the Republic 
of Cyprus exercises effective control…. Since the abovementioned 
line does not constitute an external border of the EU, special rules 
concerning the crossing of goods, services and persons need to be 
established (European Council  2005). 
 
b) Informal engagement with officials from the unrecognised state  
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Despite the efforts to bypass the TRNC (see also below), the EU has been faced 
with the need to engage with public authorities, at least to a certain degree. 
Towards overcoming issues of recognition, there are some unorthodox ways in 
which the EU and the TRNC work together, which are important for 
understanding engagement with unrecognised states. The EU deals with 
authorities of the Turkish Cypriot unrecognised state but this is done in an often 
discreet way – ‘a platonic relationship’ in the words of a Turkish Cypriot official 
(interview 2014). As explained before and towards overseeing implementation, 
the EU could neither work with RoC authorities (which do not control northern 
Cyprus) nor establish a delegation in the unrecognised TRNC. Instead, they opted 
for a combination of a Brussels -based Taskforce with a local programme 
support office (Court of Auditors 2012, 13). This Taskforce initially operated 
under the Enlargement Directorate General but was soon moved under the then 
Directorate General for Regional Policy due to Greek Cypriot objections that an 
Enlargement framework is not appropriate for an EU member state (therefore 
seeking to highlight that northern Cyprus is part of the RoC, rather than a 
separate state going through the enlargement process - see also To Vima 2014). 
On the ground, officials from the two sides often meet in neutral buildings 
(interview with EU official A’ 2009) rather than buildings that host institutions 
of the TRNC, like ministries. In addition, the Turkish Cypriots established the EU 
Coordination Centre (EUCC) in 2003 and, although resembling a lot an EU 
ministry, it was purposefully manned with technocrats and kept a profile semi-
separate from the TRNC administration. The establishment of the EUCC clearly 
aimed at facilitating interaction between the EU and the TRNC without 
recognition consequences in very physical terms too, i.e.n offering a neutral 
building where the two sides could meet (interview with KTTO Member A’ 
2009).  
 
Similarly, press releases are often avoided and policy documents or statements 
refrain from using state terminology– for example, the ‘President’ of the TRNC is 
referred to as ‘leader’ of the Turkish Cypriots. Yet, EU officials suggest that, in the 
end, the ‘right people’ for the implementation of the acquis are contacted, which 
implies contact with TRNC authorities (interview with EU official B’ 2009). 
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Finally, it is important to underline that the EU has ensured it avoids any 
recognition by implication also because the Greek Cypriots have been very 
effective in contesting links between the two sides and preventing dealings that 
might be seen as carrying recognition consequences (see Ker-Lindsay 2012). It 
is, therefore, clear that the lack of international recognition -such as defining 
characteristic of unrecognised states-, while it has not stopped engagement with 
public authorities all together, it is the causal explanation for the series of 
unique, unofficial links that the EU has chosen to develop with the TRNC. What is 
more, findings sugges that the the presence of rather strong empirical statehood 
makes engagement even more problematic: where there are developed 
governments with effective control and the ability to enter into relations with 
others, the EU will need to make an extra effort to avoid them, rather than in 
cases where sources of control- and indeed control itself- is more diffused- I 
elaborate on this in the next section. 
 
c) Replacement of public authorities with non-state actors  
The efforts to avoid recognition by implication have also taken the form of 
prioritising non-state actors as alternative interlocutors. As explained before, the 
EUCC was quickly established as a semi-official, rather technocratic institution to 
oversee EU law harmonisation, effectively a ministry of EU integration in all but 
name. While working closely with the TRNC authorities, the EUCC has kept a 
more technocratic profile and relative distance from the unrecognised state, to 
facilitate interaction with the EU free of recognition implications. On the other 
hand and in the context of the Green Line regulation, the Commission works with 
the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) rather than the trade 
ministry, which would have been the norm in any other case (European 
Commission 2004). EU officials as well as locals explain that this was done on 
purpose and so as to avoid recognition of the TRNC authorities (in this case, the 
trade ministry) by interacting with them (interview with EU official C’, KTTO 
member B’ 2009).  
 
d) Extensive engagement with civil society 
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Within the EU’s role in northern Cyprus, special attention is paid to assistance of 
and engagement with civil society. In a way, this echoes the importance that the 
EU has given to civil society in more recent years. At the same time, this study 
seems to confirm existing literature that has found a particular focus on civil 
society in other cases of unrecognised states (e.g. Berg and Pegg 2016). Members 
of the EP Group for the Relations with the Turkish Cypriots emphasised that, in 
order to avoid recognition by implication, the group worked more with non-state 
actors, including Non-Governmental Organisations (interview with MEP 2009). 
The fact that even a more political and ‘open’ institution like the EP was also 
careful of the diplomatic context testifies to the important impact that issues of 
recognition have on the nature of EU engagement.  
 
Support to civil society is also one of the major objectives of the Financial Aid 
Regulation, which includes initiatives that seek to address the way in which the 
lack of TRNC recognition impacts locals, beyond organised civil society. For 
example, the Community Scholarships scheme has been an effort to compensate 
for the fact that universities in northern Cyprus remain unrecognised and cannot 
take part in exchange programmes, such as Erasmus. Also, the Promotion of 
Youth Exchanges and Other People to People Contacts recognised that  
‘the political situation [and] isolation [of the Turkish Cypriots] 
resulted a remarkable deficit of knowledge about the European 
Union [and] it is therefore appropriate to enable the Turkish 
Cypriots as EU citizens to develop fruitful relations with other EU 
Member States’ (European Commission 2009). 
 
Finally, the discussion of the EU’s engagement would not be complete without a 
reflection on how this has been perceived by the locals and the impact that might 
have on the efforts for conflict resolution. Early in the process of accession, the 
EU’s decision to recognise RoC as the only legitimate partner for negotiations led 
to one of the worst periods in terms of inter-communal relations, with the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership repeatedly condemning the EU (Republic of Turkey 
2017). Years later, even moderate Turkish Cypriots elites continue to regard this 
decision as a main reason of ongoing Turkish Cypriot mistrust and defensive 
reaction towards the EU (interview with Turkish Cypriot official 2009). More 
recently, the fact that issues of recognition have not allowed the EU to meet 
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‘promises’ (interviews with various Turkish Cypriot officials 2009 and 2016) of 
helping the economic development of Turkish Cypriots (e.g. through the pending 
Trade regulation) has added to the frustration. The public appeal of the EU has 
decreased in compare to before (Eurobarometer 2018), while some Turkish 
Cypriot elites continue to be sceptical of the EU. For example, the EU’s move to 
introduce an ad hoc committee during the latest inter-communal peace talks in 
2016 was met by scepticism by some Turkish Cypriot elites, who feared this 
might allow Greek Cypriots to control the process of EU law harmonization 
(interview with Turkish Cypriot official 2016). Particularly less Europhile parts 
of the political system react with more intransigence to the EU’s non-recognition 
(interview with Turkish Cypriot official 2018). As a result, issues of recognition 
have created Turkish Cypriot inflexibility and, consequently, posed limitations to 
the EU’s overarching aim of assisting conflict resolution and reaching an 
agreement.  
 
In summary, the study of the TRNC offers a number of findings that are 
potentially important for the role of the EU in unrecognised states and suggest 
that (a) unrecognised borders are managed on an suis generis basis, (b) 
engagement with state officials is informal, c) state authorities are replaced in 
certain positions by non-state actors and, finally, (d) emphasis is placed on civil 
society. While instrumental in implementing at least some of the EU proposals 
for northern Cyprus, those unique ways of EU engagement have done little to 
assist the resolution of the conflict- in fact they can be seen as potentially 
harmful to reconciliation (Kyris 2018). More research on the matter will shed 
light on whether those ways in which the EU engages with unrecognised states 
hold for other cases and the impact they might have for conflict resolution. To 
facilitate this, the next section discusses how the findings of the TRNC are 
important for similar types of unrecognised states and how they might differ to 
other variants of the phenomenon.  
The Concept of State Avoidance 
Why has the EU tried to avoid the TRNC while, in other cases of unrecognised 
states, like Palestine or Kosovo, has encouraged statehood, also via institution- 
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building? This section aims to open up the discussion on whether we can explain 
those differences in EU approaches by looking at variations of statehood across 
unrecognised states. In order to offer a more nuanced interpretation of the 
findings of this paper as well as to facilitate more research on the matter, I 
problematise the concept of unrecognised statehood and I briefly discuss 
differences between types of unrecognised states, and how the EU deals with 
them. I do so by largely drawing on the conceptual discussion on sovereignty, 
which, also through the study of the TRNC, I identify as a prominent condition 
that shapes the way the EU engages with unrecognised states. I focus on 
international recognition and empirical statehood, as indicators of two main 
dimensions of sovereignty: external and internal (see for example Biersteker and 
Weber 1996, Jackson 2007).  
 
Beginning with international recognition, its lack can be seen as the sine qua non 
characteristic of unrecognised states. Geldenhuys (2009) reflects on these 
entities as lacking de jure recognition, despite what is often effective control of 
the (unrecognised) government over their declared territory. In this regard, RoC 
has always been recognised as the only legitimate government in Cyprus, even 
after the division of the island meant that the government is now controlled by 
Greek Cypriots. Oppositely, the TRNC suffers from a rather significant deficit of 
international recognition, since it is only recognised by Turkey. In the previous 
section, I elaborated on the range of limitations that the non-recognition of the 
TRNC poses to the EU, including the inability to implement a range of its 
programmes or plan in the long term. I also explored a range of ways in which 
the EU has tried to overcome those challenges of recognition, such as informal 
engagement with state officials, replacement of state authorities by non-state 
actors or by placing greater emphasis on civil society. Preliminary evidence 
suggest that the EU emphasises assistance to civil society in other cases with 
similar deficit of recognition (e.g. Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria). In 
this regard, this paper aims to encourage more research on the causality 
between lack of recognition and prioritisation of non-state actors.  
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In order to do so, I suggest that the different ways in which the EU has 
endeavoured in TRNC can be discussed as what I have called a ‘state avoidance’ 
approach. Scholars, including myself (Kyris 2018), have before conceptualised 
the way in which the EU and other actors, like states, have tried to engage with 
unrecognised states in a way that does not imply recognition. ‘Engagement 
without recognition’ is an increasingly popular conceptualisation of approaches 
whereby engagement is pursued without formally recognising the government 
of a self-declared stateiv.  Clearly, state avoidance, in the form of managing 
unrecognised borders sui generis, informal links to state authorities and more 
links to non-state actors and civil society, does not differ much to the concept of 
engagement without recognition. Yet, the different term here aims to highlight 
the concept of state and to contrast efforts of the EU to avoid a state with efforts 
to build a state.  In the rest of the paper, I contrast these two, exploring whether 
the different approaches of the EU nest in differences in terms of statehood, both 
in terms of recognition and empirical statehood. 
 
While the TRNC remains largely unrecognised, this is not the case with all 
unrecognised states. Kosovo is recognised by the majority of UN member states 
and Palestine is the most recognised of existing unrecognised states. What is 
more, especially in the case of Palestine, there is also quite extensive titular 
recognition (i.e. the recognition of a right to statehood, see also Crawford 1979). 
In these cases, the EU seems to engage much more openly and directly. In fact, 
rather than avoiding the state, the EU has embarked on an effort to build the 
states of Kosovo and Palestine (e.g. Tansey 2007 on Kosovo, Bouris 2014 on 
Palestine). Given that the EU’s avoidance of the TRNC directly relates to the lack 
of recognition, could we explain the greater and more open engagement with 
Kosovo and Palestine based on the greater extent of recognition? Is the EU more 
confident to build a state where there is a wish to see one emerge? Those are 
pressing questions requiring an answer and more research on the matter will 
help understand the presence of the EU in conditions of contested statehood.  
 
This brings the discussion to the issue of internal sovereignty, i.e. empirical 
statehood in the form of effectively governing over population and territory. In 
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both the cases of Kosovo and Palestine, the EU saw a clear deficit in governance 
when it started being involved, and this created room for the development of 
state building activities. Yet, what these two cases also share, unlike other 
unrecognised states, is a an implicit or explicit ‘titular’ recognition, i.e. the 
recognition of a right to statehood, even from actors that do not recognise a state 
yet. This is explicit in the EU support of a two-state solution for Palestine and 
Israel, and a bit more implicit in the case of Kosovo. The fact that the two biggest 
statebuilding projects of the EU are also the ones that display this type of 
recognition suggests a link between the two and more research on this front is 
welcome.  It also points to an interesting interrelation between international 
recognition and empirical statehood, as two dimensions of sovereignty, and the 
way they shape EU approaches. Indeed, this interrelation was also obvious in the 
case of the TRNC, albeit in an opposing way: it was the presence of an 
administration with empirical statehood, control and authority that made all the 
more difficult for the EU to engage without recognising. In other words, in 
northern Cyprus, the existence of a clearly defined in terms of population, 
borders and institutions entity made all the more pressing the EU’s need to avoid 
it. We saw, for example, how the capacity of the TRNC to control its boundary 
with the recognised RoC forced the EU to come up with sui generis measures to 
regulate the border that it does not formally acknowledge.  
 
It is therefore clear that the relationship between antithetical extremes of low 
and high degrees of recognition and empirical statehood has some rather 
interesting stories to tell about unrecognised states, and the role of the EU in 
them. For that reason and unlike previous conceptualisations of the 
phenomenon, I argue for broader definitional criteria both in terms of 
recognition and of empirical statehood. Unlike some previous studies (e.g. Pegg 
1998, Caspersen 2012), I include in my definition cases that enjoy extensive yet 
not full recognition (e.g. Palestine), what we we could largely recognised states, 
in order to highlighting potential differences to largely unrecognised states, like 
the TRNC. Similarly, while previous authors have included the presence of 
empirical statehood in their definitional criteria (hence another term that is 
often used is ‘de facto states’- see for example Pegg 1998), I argue for definitions 
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that allow for cases with low degree of empirical statehood (such as when the EU 
started engaging with institution building in Kosovo and Palestine), in order to 
test the interrelation of extreme presence and deficit in both recognition and 
empirical statehood. In this paper for example, we saw empirical statehood 
playing an important role in the way in which the EU engages, whether there are 
opportunities for state building or, oppositely, extra pressures to avoid a 
consolidated stateWhile this research has focused on the role of the EU and how 
it is shaped by those conditions of unrecognised statehood, allowing for variation 
in both international recognition and empirical statehood is potentially useful for 
studying a range of different issues that might relate to unrecognised  states.  
Conclusion 
The question of how does the EU engage with unrecognised states remains 
relatively unexplored but hugely important in both academic and policy terms. 
The constantly increasing conflict management efforts of the EU, and of the 
international community in more general, has found its way through an 
archipelago of unrecognised states and a more rigorous conceptualisation of 
those entities and their relevance to European and international politics is of the 
greatest importance. 
 
In this regard, a controlled historical analysis of the TRNC uncovered causal links 
between characteristics of unrecognised statehood and the engagement of the 
EU in northern Cyprus. Analysis found an approach of what I hereby call state 
avoidance, defined by a) sui generis management of unrecognised borders, b) 
unofficial meetings with state authorities, c) replacement of state authorities by 
non-state actors and d) more emphasis on civil society. These elements of EU 
engagement link directly to the low international recognition and high empirical 
statehood of the TRNC and the fact that there is a rather developed state-like 
entity in Cyprus, which the EU needs to try to avoid. This discussion of state 
avoidance complements studies on state-building, which have focused more on 
mirror images of the TRNC: cases of more extensive- yet far from full- 
international recognition but with a greater deficit in empirical statehood when 
the EU embarked on engagement with them, such as Kosovo or Palestine.  
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By doing so, this paper aims to encourage more research on cases similar to the 
TRNC but also unrecognised states with different degrees of international 
recognition or empirical statehood. To facilitate this and following the discussion 
of the case study, I argued for a broader conceptualisation of unrecognised states 
than what is now found in the literature and which includes cases with extensive 
but still not full recognition and/ or rather underdeveloped state systems. This 
can encourage comparisons across different types of unrecognised states, both 
with regard to processes via which their unique characteristics inform EU 
engagement and issues beyond the focus of this paper. Findings of this article but 
also the set of further research avenues outlined are crucial if we want to 
understand international conflict and the limitations or opportunities that 
contested statehood poses to the promotion of security and stability in European 
and international politics today and in the future, as well as overcoming those 
limitations.
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i
 Unlike some previous studies, I include in my definition of unrecognised states cases that enjoy extensive yet 
not full recognition but also rather low empirical statehood, i.e. government and control of territory and 
population. This is to test the interrelation of extreme presence and deficit in both recognition and empirical 
statehood and I expand more on definitional issues in the last section of the paper. At the same time, my 
criterion of lack of UN membership, allows to exclude states that, although not fully recognised are not 
analytically relevant here- for example, UN members like Israel or the Republic of Cyprus do not enjoy universal 
recognition strictly speaking. The definition does not include examples of political entities that are part of 
recognised state structures, even if secession is or has been their objective (e.g. Iraqi Kurdistan, Republika Srpska 
today) or unrecognised governments rather than states. Lastly, in contested statehood terms and similarly to 
other works before (e.g. Geldenhuys 2009), the source of contestation here is external, i.e. the international 
community, rather than internal, e.g. the locals. This is why the term ‘unrecognised’ states is advanced, although 
it is very close to how the term ‘contested states’ has been used by many (e.g. Ker-Lindsay 2012). 
ii
 Based on this definition, Taiwan must also be considered as an unrecognised state, despite being of less 
relevance to the EU. 
iii
 For more on the history of the Cyprus problem, see Castleberry 1964, Joseph 1999, Fisher 2001, 
Hatzivasileiou 2005. For a more Turkish Cypriot- focused works see Kaymak 2009) 
iv
 For an overview of the debate on ‘engagement without recognition’ please see the Special Issue of 
Ethnopolitics, edited by Ker-Lindsay and Berg (2018). 
